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Given it was not in issue, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Supreme Court did
not tackle the question of whether the personal disgorgement claim exists. It went
so far as to consider the simplicity of a single, proprietary remedy advantageous,
but it did not expressly adopt this position.37 While, in a judgment handed down
between FHR’s hearing and judgment, the Court of Appeal held inNovoship (UK)
Ltd v Nikitin that a personal disgorgement remedy does exist in equity, it was said
to exist as against non-fiduciaries—dishonest assistants and knowing recipients.
That no trust and confidence was ever reposed in accessories justifies the lesser
remedies against them.38 This distinction could well turn out to be determinative
that the remedies are different vis-à-vis fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries.
Conclusion
FHRmust be welcomed for settling the specific issue it set out to settle. It is also,
happily, not reliant on legal fictions. Less welcome is its failure to tackle the
theoretical justifications for creating a property right. Granted, it must be right to
have refused to close the door on the personal disgorgement claim or to have laid
down rules without concrete facts upon which to test them. But omitting principled
justifications simply puts off taking the first step in answering the big
question—precisely how to decide between a personal and a proprietary remedy.
FHR is a useful fixed point, even if it does not display a signpost to the next stop.
Given the amounts of money at stake ($150 million in Novoship) and this mix
of competing and conflicting principles, it is a good probability that we will see
future litigation on this point where the breach of fiduciary duty was not accepting
a bribe. It would be most preferable to develop a principled way of deciding,
instead of flip-flopping as in the past. This may yet be possible, although it is
impossible to make concrete predictions—at least until after the next case.
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The concept of the donatio mortis causa (“DMC”) may seem to be, and possibly
should be, the preserve of equity examinations, but two recent cases have
demonstrated the ability of this doctrine to impact on 21st century lives. This article
will consider the judgment in King v Dubrey1 and will argue that the decision in
this case, together with the decision in Vallee v Birchwood2 last year, have
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2Vallee v Birchwood [2013] EWHC 1449 (Ch); [2014] Ch. 271.
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(deliberately or inadvertently) extended the DMC requirements, blurring the
distinction between the DMC and a nuncupative will to the extent that the doctrine
endangers the Wills Act 1837 formalities for testamentary dispositions.
Briefly, the facts ofKingwere as follows. Mr King had lived with his aunt (June
Fairbrother) from 2007 until her death. June Fairbrother had executed a valid will
in 1998 which left various small legacies to family and friends, and the bulk of
her estate to animal charities. After Mr King came to live with her she apparently
made a number of comments to the effect that the house would be his after her
death. June Fairbrother attempted on various occasions to make a new will, each
of which left the house (and the rest of her property) to Mr King. Unfortunately,
none of these were validly executed. On her death, the 1998 will was therefore
admitted to probate.
There was no allegation of detrimental reliance, so no claim for estoppel could
be made, but instead Mr King brought a claim against the charities (the minor
legatees did not contest the proceedings) to the effect that his aunt had given her
house to him by way of a DMC between four and six months prior to her death.
At this time, June Fairbrother had handed over the deeds to the house (which was
unregistered) and had told Mr King that “this will be yours when I go”. Mr King
took the bundle of deeds and placed them in the wardrobe in his room within the
house.Mr King had alsomade an alternative claim under s.1(1)(e) of the Inheritance
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 as a person maintained by the
deceased, although if the DMC claim was successful the claim under the Family
Provision legislation would be rendered irrelevant, so the DMC was considered
first. The Family Provision claim is not relevant to this article so will not be
considered further.
The requirements for a donatio mortis causa
A DMC is one of the equitable exceptions to the otherwise strict formality rules
for transfers of property. For a DMC to be valid, it must satisfy the following:
• the gift is made by the donor in contemplation of their death;
• the gift is conditional upon the death of the donor; and
• the donor must part with dominion or control over the property.
Being conditional on the donor’s death, it only takes effect at this time and is
revocable at any time prior to death. It is therefore suspiciously similar to a legacy
under a will, yet it need not comply with the formalities set out in s.9 of the Wills
Act 1837. Likewise, whilst the events which support the DMC occur inter vivos,
the perfection of the donee’s title does not occur until the donor’s death, and so
there is no need for the DMC to comply with any formal requirements for inter
vivos gifts of property of that nature.3 Instead, a DMC can be (and often is) merely
oral, with the court relying on the evidence of the donee and any other available
witnesses.
As with all exceptions to statutory requirements, one would expect the courts
to exercise caution, to both guard against fraud and also emphasise the importance
3 So, for example, there is no need for a s.52 Law of Property Act 1925 compliant deed on the transfer of land.
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of the statutory provisions. Indeed, past case law in this area reflects these concerns.
As Lord Evershed MR stated in Birch v Treasury Solicitor4:
“[T]he courts will examine any case of alleged donatio mortis causa and reject
it if in truth what is alleged as a donatio is an attempt to make a nuncupative
will, or a will in other respects not complying with the forms required by the
Wills Act.”
It is this distinction between a DMC and a nuncupative will that is the focus of
this article, a distinction which is not always easy to make. A true DMC must be
a hybrid beast—part legacy (in order to comply with the first two requirements),
and part immediate gift (to comply with the final element).5 Few gifts would seem
capable of such a chameleon-like nature, so one would expect alleged DMCs to
arise rarely and for claims to be upheld extremely infrequently. As King followed
so soon after Vallee, the three criteria, and the way in which they were interpreted
in these cases, must be considered carefully.
In contemplation of death
In most previous DMC cases, the events on which the DMC claim were founded
happened very close to the death of the donor, yet in King the comments made by
June Fairbrother occurred some four to six months prior to her death. Luckily for
Mr King, the case of Vallee had also concerned a DMC for which the relevant
events had occurred some time before the death of the donor. In Vallee, Jonathan
Gaunt QC considered this issue very carefully, and distinguished between being
“in contemplation of death” and death being imminent:
“The question is not whether the donor had good grounds to anticipate his
imminent demise or whether his demise proved to be as speedy as he may
have feared but whether the motive for the gift was that he subjectively
contemplated the possibility of death in the near future … The fact that the
case law requires only that the gift be made in the contemplation and not
necessarily the expectation of death supports this view.”6
At the time, the author voiced concerns that such a view could be seen as
encouraging a laissez-faire attitude amongst the elderly.7 Whilst the death of June
Fairbrother pre-dated the case of Vallee, which cannot therefore have affected her
knowledge or beliefs in any way, it would seem likely that Vallee did at least
prompt Mr King’s solicitors to remember this rarely used exemption, and possibly
therefore led to the litigation in question.
What is troubling is the ease with which the judge in King, Charles Hollander
QC, accepted that the gift in the instant case was in contemplation of death. The
various charities who stood to inherit under the 1998 will argued that death is
inevitable for anyone, and therefore, as June was not seriously ill, the gift could
4Birch v Treasury Solicitor [1951] Ch. 298 at 307; [1950] 2 All E.R. 1198 CA at 1205.
5 See Re Beaumont [1902] 1 Ch. 889 Ch D at 892 (per Buckley J): “A donatio mortis causa is a singular form of
gift. It may be said to be of an amphibious nature, being a gift which is neither entirely inter vivos nor testamentary.”
6Vallee [2013] EWHC 1449 (Ch); [2014] Ch. 271 at [25].
7 J. Brook, “Death bed wills” (2013) 314 P.L.J. 26.
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not have really been “in contemplation of death”. However, Charles Hollander
QC simply states that
“[t]he recent authority Vallee v Birchwood demonstrated that it was not
necessary for the death to occur within days of the gift. The contemplation
of death within five months there was contemplation of impending death.”8
It was held that, given June Fairbrother was “increasingly preoccupied with her
impending death”9 the gift was in contemplation of death.
This is, however, an over-simplification of the judgment in Vallee. There, the
donee daughter lived abroad and only saw her father a couple of times a year.
When they had parted in August, his acts of handing over the deeds and a set of
keys to the house were undertaken in the belief that he was unlikely to be alive at
Christmas when she was next due to visit. It is not too great a stretch of the
imagination to say that these acts were genuinely “in contemplation of death”—he
was presumably contemplating the fact that this could be the last time he would
see his daughter.
In contrast, Mr King lived with his aunt. He probably saw her daily. Can a
comment to the effect that the house would be his when she died, made some
months before her eventual death, really be taken to be in contemplation of death?
King followed Valleewithout any critical analysis, or exploration of the particular
facts of the case; instead, Vallee was cited as authority for the proposition that
contemplation of death within the next five months is adequate.
This over-simplifies the DMC requirement and potentially widens its scope to
includemany comments made by the elderly and the terminally ill. Such comments
are usually no more than recognition that they are reaching the end of their lives
and ought to put their affairs in order. Are they really contemplating death “in the
near future” and worthy of an exemption from statutory provisions? The better
analysis is that they are considering to whom they wish to leave their assets and
this should be a prompt for a valid will to be made.
Conditional on death
As the DMC is conditional on death, the donor is able to revoke the DMC at any
time up until death, either by making a new will or by re-taking dominion of the
property. This means that the status of a recipient of a DMC is almost exactly the
same as the status of an intended legatee under a will, which can, of course, also
be revoked at any time prior to death—both have a mere spes until the death of
the donor or testator.
In many earlier DMC cases the donor’s statement was to the effect of “If I do
not make it, you are to have this.”10 However, the courts have been willing to infer
conditionality even where the words of the donor might appear to suggest an
8King [2014] EWHC 2083 (Ch); [2014] W.T.L.R. 1411 at [46].
9King [2014] EWHC 2083 (Ch); [2014] W.T.L.R. 1411 at [47].
10 See, for example, Cain v Moon [1896] 2 Q.B. 283 QBD, in which the deceased’s statement was: “Everything I
possess and the bank-note is for you if I die”; and Birch [1951] Ch. 298; [1950] 2 All E.R. 1198, where the deceased
stated that: “I want you to take them home and keep them and if anything happens to me I want you and Frank to
have the money in the banks.”
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immediate gift. Thus in Sen v Headley,11 the donor’s comment was “The house is
yours, Margaret.”
In King a similar inference was made. The charities argued that, as June
Fairbrother had not said “If I die, the house is yours”, but rather “this will be yours
when I go” (emphasis added) this was not a conditional gift but rather a statement
of testamentary intent. However, this interpretation was rejected without any clear
explanation behind the reasoning. Charles Hollander QC stated that “the words
used, in context, were indeed suggestive of a gift conditional on death and not
consistent with any other interpretation.”12
On the one hand, it is arguable that a gift of the donor’s main residence could
only be intended as conditional upon their death as they would need a home during
their lifetime. It would seem clear from the facts that the court has interpreted the
gift as an (imperfect) inter vivos gift with a condition precedent, namely the death
of the donor. However, this willingness to infer conditionality has resulted in this
element being of very little practical import in identifying a DMC. As the charities
argued, a statement to the effect that something will pass to the donee when the
donor dies is identical in form to a testamentary disposition; if conditionality is
inferred without detailed consideration of the semantics of the statement then this
requirement would seem to have become superfluous.
Yet it could be argued that a gift should only be deemed conditional on death
when it is made by someone who is contemplating death unexpectedly, such as
an accident victim. Such donors may genuinely be trying to dispose of their property
without an opportunity to make a valid will, but the dispositions are only to take
effect if they die. If they survive, they would expect to live for many more years.
In both King, and previously in Vallee, the donor was likely to die within the near
future simply by virtue of their age and infirmity. It therefore seems inappropriate
to describe these gifts as “conditional on death”; instead, they are gifts to be made
“on the event of death”, as with any testamentary disposition.
Parting with dominion
The requirement that the donor parts with dominion goes to the heart of why the
DMC is seen as a valid exception to the Wills Act 1837 requirements, instead of
being viewed as an invalid nuncupative will. It should be noted that whilst the
basis for the first two elements of the DMC is in Roman Law, it is this third
requirement which was included by the courts in order to provide a degree of
evidence and certainty in an otherwise incredibly vague area.13 If the donor were
to keep control of the property until his or her death he or she would be effectively
making an oral will. However, by parting with dominion the donor has provided
extrinsic evidence of his or her intentions and wishes, and equity will therefore
construct a trust over the property and intervene to require the personal
representatives to perfect this imperfect gift.
What amounts to parting with dominion differs according to the nature of the
property. Early DMC cases related to gifts of chattels: for such items, the donor
11 Sen v Headley [1991] Ch. 425; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 1308 CA (Civ Div).
12King [2014] EWHC 2083 (Ch); [2014] W.T.L.R. 1411 at [43].
13 SeeWard v Turner (1752) 2 Ves. Sen. 431 at 441; 28 E.R. 275 Ct of Ch. at 281 (per Lord Hardwicke): “The
civil law has been received in England in respect of such donations only so far as attended with delivery.”
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parted with dominion simply by handing the object to the recipient. The doctrine
was then extended to choses in action, such as bonds and bank accounts, for which
the donor parts with dominion by giving the donee whatever documentation was
required to evidence ownership, the so-called “indicia of title”.14
Prior to the 1991 Court of Appeal case of Sen15 it was not thought possible for
a testator to part with dominion of a house, but the judgment in this case held that
the indicia of title were the deeds and, by parting with possession of a set of keys
(even though the deceased also retained a set) and parting with possession of the
title deeds the deceased had parted with dominion of the house.
However, in Sen the donor was hospitalised when the deeds were handed over,
and had not in fact returned to his house prior to his death. In contrast, in Vallee
the deceased had continued to live in the house between the date of the DMC and
his eventual death. Jonathan Gaunt QC considered this in detail and concluded
that it was possible to part with dominion and remain in residence, therefore in
King no further analysis of this aspect was undertaken. Instead, the various charities
submitted that because the title deeds remained in June Fairbrother’s house (albeit
in Mr King’s wardrobe) they were still within her control. This argument was
rejected, first because the wardrobe was in the part of the house over which Mr
King had exclusive use, and secondly because the conversation between Mr King
and June Fairbrother “indicated that June did indeed intend to part with dominion
over the property, but that was to be conditional on her death.”16 Thus instead of
requiring the parting of dominion to be independently supported by the evidence,
it was dependent on the previous conclusions that the gift was conditional on death
and, as has been discussed, this was already an inference barely supported by the
facts.
Very few DMC cases in the past have involved real property, yet both King and
Vallee before it concerned DMCs of the deceased’s home. Whilst it seems as
though DMCs should be increasingly rare, in many ways this is to be expected.
If, as in these cases, the estate consists of a freehold property and very little else,
a DMC of the house itself will affect the whole of the will or intestacy, and litigation
is much more likely.
Despite the relaxation of DMCs to cover land in Sen, it has been noted that a
DMC may not be possible over registered land since dematerialisation of title in
2003.17 Whilst this should prevent DMCs from becoming a common occurrence,
most of the remaining unregistered land is likely to be owned by the elderly, who
have not moved house in the past 25 years. There is therefore scope for more
similar cases in the near future.
Should the DMC exception be allowed to flourish?
As can be seen from the discussion above, the delicate lines between a DMC and
a testamentary disposition have become increasingly blurred. Yet if such an
14Birch [1951] Ch. 298 at 308; [1950] 2 All E.R. 1198 at 1205.
15 Sen [1991] Ch. 425; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 1308.
16King [2014] EWHC 2083 (Ch); [2014] W.T.L.R. 1411 at [49].
17 See, for example, N. Roberts, “Donationes mortis causa in a dematerialised world” [2013] 77 Conv. 113. It is
possible that a future decision may find that the keys to the house are the sole indicia of title, but given the above
comments about the importance of parting with dominion to the whole concept of the DMC, then the author would
be extremely concerned if subsequent case law were to take this route.
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exception is to be permitted, the court must be clear as to what the distinguishing
hallmarks of a DMC are, because these are the elements whichmark it out as being
worthy of protection under equitable principles. From the discussion above, it
would appear that both the requirements that the gift be conditional on death, and
in contemplation of death, are now practically identical to testamentary dispositions.
Therefore it is the requirement that the donor part with dominion which is the
unique characteristic of a DMC, but is this sufficiently defined?
In Vallee Jonathan Gaunt QC noted the fact that the concept of dominion is “a
slippery one”.18 It was acknowledged that it would be permissible for the donor to
carry out various acts (such as maintenance of the property) having parted with
dominion, provided that it was out of the donor’s power to change the property
for something else.
If, after the DMC, the donor is still altering and changing his or her will then it
is difficult to see how the donor can be said to have parted with dominion, unless
each attempted alteration is viewed as a revocation of the DMC. Conversely, if
the requirement that the donor part with dominion is applied strictly, with all
control over the property put out of his or her reach, this might impinge on the
donor’s ability to revoke the gift prior to his or her death. The donor could ask the
donee to return the gift, but what power would the donor have over the donee were
the donee to refuse? The acts required for parting with dominion seem to have
been re-interpreted throughout the history of the DMC, in order to ensure that an
alleged DMC fits (or fails to meet) the criteria. Slippery indeed.
The author has set out above her concerns about the weakening of the
“contemplation of death” requirement, but the scope of the whole concept also
needs to be considered further. Jonathan Gaunt QC commented in Vallee:
“I do not consider that Equity intervenes in such cases only out of sympathy
for those caught out in extremis but rather to give effect to the intentions of
donors sufficiently evidenced by their acts such that the conscience of the
donor’s personal representative is affected.”19
This sets an extremely low threshold. Unlike with a case of estoppel, there is no
need for the recipient to have acted to his or her detriment in any way. This is
arguably creating a new unconscionability requirement which seems to imply that
a donor must adhere to whatever wishes he or she enunciates during his or her
latter days and months, even if the donor does not consider them seriously enough
to take formal steps to reflect them in a will. This would be contrary to the
revocability requirement of both DMCs and testamentary dispositions: if the
equitable peg on which DMCs are hung is that the conscience of the donor is
pricked this would imply that, having created the DMC, the donor is no longer
free to execute a new will, which may or may not accord with the intentions
demonstrated a few weeks or months earlier.
Between the date of the DMC statement and her death, June Fairbrother had
made at least two failed attempts to make a new will in Mr King’s favour. It was
argued by the various charities which stood to inherit under the 1998 will that
these attempted wills were sufficient to show that she had revoked the DMC; the
18Vallee [2013] EWHC 1449 (Ch); [2014] Ch. 271 at [42].
19Vallee [2013] EWHC 1449 (Ch); [2014] Ch. 271 at [27].
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argument being that she would only have made a will bequeathing the property to
her nephew if she did not believe that she had already validly disposed of it to him.
This argument was rejected, on the basis that there is nothing inconsistent about
having an attempted imperfect gift, conditional on death, and then trying to perfect
it by executing a valid will.20
Clearly, if June Fairbrother had executed a valid will, leaving the house to Mr
King or to another, then the DMCwould have been either unnecessary or revoked.
But the draft wills that had been written by her show an awareness of the need to
make a formal will, and her failure to take steps to execute the will would indicate
that she may still have been deliberating who should receive her property on her
death. If June Fairbrother was not certain enough to formally execute the will, then
the use of a DMC to perfect the failed gift potentially imparts sentiments onto the
donor which she did not herself hold.
The only corroboration of a DMC is, often, the parting with dominion, and the
less that this can be evidenced, the more the DMC must be doubted. Mr King’s
integrity is beyond doubt, but the facts can be used to illustrate the difficulties. In
an equivalent case, it is possible that entirely different conversations had taken
place. The party in Mr King’s position may have gained possession of the title
deeds by, for example, reminding his aunt that they would be needed by the
executor on her death, and offering to look after them for her until that time.
Throughout the judgment in King the draft wills were used to support the DMC,
and by doing so the invalid wills were effectively “rescued”.
The author’s concern is that this seems to be using the principle of the DMC in
a similar manner to the rule in Strong v Bird21—June Fairbrother decided that she
wanted Mr King to have the house, but never formalised this legacy. However,
the Court concluded that this intention continued until her death (as evidenced by
the repeated failed wills) and therefore the legacy was “perfected” by using the
DMC mechanism.
However, is this appropriate? The stringent requirements of the Wills Act 1837
are designed to prevent fraud, and without those safeguards any DMC is open to
allegations of fraud. This has been considered in the past in Re Dillon, where it
was made clear that the burden of proof was on the donee,22 although in that
particular case there was also extrinsic evidence of the donor’s intention as they
had signed the cheque. It was specifically noted inKing that there were no witnesses
to corroborate the crucial conversation between Mr King and his aunt.23 Although
Charles Hollander QC acknowledged that he had “not found it an easy question
whether to accept Mr King’s evidence”,24 he viewed the various unsuccessful
attempts by June Fairbrother to make a new will as “powerful corroborative
evidence”25 to support the assertion that June Fairbrother intended to leave her
property to Mr King. There is a danger that failure to comply with statutory
requirements has become the evidencewhich renders those requirements redundant.
20King [2014] EWHC 2083 (Ch); [2014] W.T.L.R. 1411 at [51].
21 Strong v Bird (1874) L.R. 18 Eq. 315 Ct of Ch.
22 See Re Dillon (1890) 44 Ch. D. 76 CA at 80.
23King [2014] EWHC 2083 (Ch); [2014] W.T.L.R. 1411 at [29.3].
24King [2014] EWHC 2083 (Ch); [2014] W.T.L.R. 1411 at [31].
25King [2014] EWHC 2083 (Ch); [2014] W.T.L.R. 1411 at [33].
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There were also concerns about the capacity of Mr King’s aunt. Had she been
an elderly testatrix executing a will, one would hope that the “golden rule” of
Kenward v Adams26would have been followed, to provide evidence of her capacity
to execute a will. The greater leniency there is in permitting DMCs, particularly
by the elderly, the greater the chances are of fraud and undue influence. Strict
scrutiny is necessary to prevent “valid” DMCs being made by people who lack
the capacity for the decision with which they have been credited.
The comment by Lord EvershedMR in Birch27 quoted above is the one to which
we repeatedly return—the courts must examine the facts to determine whether
what is alleged to be a DMC is actually an attempt to make a will which does not
comply with theWills Act 1837. In this author’s opinion the acts of June Fairbrother
were the acts of a person trying to make a new will, but failing. No matter how
much the Court wanted to carry out June Fairbrother’s wishes, it has put the ethos
of the Wills Act 1837 at risk by trying to do so.
Conclusions
King, and Vallee before it, have potentially combined to expand DMCs to cover
numerous acts by the elderly and terminally ill, which should really be interpreted
as statements of intent to make a will to formalise the testator’s wishes. The original
justifications for the DMC, where perhaps the testator is illiterate or unable to seek
legal advice in sufficient time prior to their death, are not relevant in the 21st
century. It is undeniable that those who die intestate or without a recent will
reflecting their intentions often cause upset to their family, but the use of the DMC
to rectify the situation is worrying and, arguably, unnecessary given the relative
ease of making a valid will. This could encourage litigation in an area where
contentious work rarely has any real winners.
It is worthy of comment that in both of these recent cases the deprived legatees
were not close to the deceased. In Vallee the residuary legatee was a long-estranged
brother, and in King they were various animal charities. As was noted by Charles
Hollander QC when considering whether Mr King could successfully claim under
the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, the charities do
not have “financial needs” which can be assessed.28 This raises the question of
whether the decisions in each case would have been the same had the residuary
legatee been, for example, a cousin with whom the deceased was in regular contact?
If so, then this is allowing the facts to determine the law, which is surely not in
the best interests of future litigants.
Whilst the requirements for a DMC seem clear, greater scrutiny reveals problems
around distinguishing “true” contemplation of death, and differentiating it from
the usual awareness of the elderly that they are nearing the end of their lives. One
26Kenward v Adams, The Times, November 29, 1975. The “golden rule” is that where there is any doubt as to a
testator’s capacity, the professional instructed should ask a medical practitioner to witness the will or give their
opinion on capacity.
27Birch [1951] Ch. 298 at 307; [1950] 2 All E.R. 1198 at 1205.
28King [2014] EWHC 2083 (Ch); [2014] W.T.L.R. 1411 at [66].
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has sympathy for the litigants, but cannot help but conclude that sympathy is not
a sound basis for a legal principle.
Juliet Brook*
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